Abstract: The Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection has long been troubled by the issue of personal identity, but prior to the advent of such concerns there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person's body. Although this latter issue has exercised scholars of various ages, concern with it was particularly keen in early modern times. In this paper I chart the various ways bodily identity was conceived by early modern thinkers in connection with the resurrection, as well as the key objections their contemporaries developed in response.
Introduction
It is well-known that the Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection, that is, the belief that all human beings will one day be resurrected by God, has long been troubled by the issue of personal identity. Concern over how a person can retain his or her identity in the resurrection, given the apparent break in psychological continuity between death and revivification, has existed since the time of Locke, and continues to exercise contemporary philosophers and theologians. Yet prior to the advent of such concerns about personal identity there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person's body. To understand why there should have been such a concern, it is important to recognize that, notwithstanding the vision of bodiless souls engendered by Cartesian metaphysics, the Judaeo-Christian tradition has customarily considered humans to be -and only ever be -embodied, corporeal beings, usually some sort of unified composite of body and soul, one upshot of which is that representatives of this tradition have understood 'resurrection' to mean a bodily resurrection rather than a revival of a disembodied soul.
1 This was and still is a popular belief, especially among
Christians. Many of the early church fathers, such as Athenagoras, 2 Justin Martyr, 3
Now in and of itself, the belief in a bodily resurrection has not been, historically, an especially problematic one for the Judaeo-Christian tradition, since the religions of this tradition all posit the existence of a God whose power and knowledge are so vast (maximally so, according to some) that the task of effecting a bodily resurrection of humans seems no more difficult -indeed, much less difficult -than some of the other things this God is often credited with, such as creating the universe ex nihilo. So if those belonging to the Judaeo-Christian tradition had simply stated their belief that the resurrection would be a bodily one, arguably the doctrine would not have caused its adherents to have any serious philosophical misgivings about it. 9 But many of the Judaeo-Christian tradition held it to be true, and in some cases as even an article of faith, that humans would not only experience a bodily resurrection, but would actually be resurrected with the same bodies possessed during normal life. 10 Scriptural passages were often cited in defence of this view, but many also stressed that, unless humans receive the same body they had when alive, their revivification could scarcely be termed a resurrection in the first place. 11 So to many, the very idea of a bodily resurrection presupposed that it will be the same bodies that are brought back. Some also argued that humans would be resurrected with the same bodies because justice required it: in the Judaeo-Christian tradition it was a common belief that body and soul were equal partners in all of a person's actions, nefarious or otherwise, so in order that rewards and punishments be meted out fairly the wicked must be punished in the same bodies in which they did their sinning, and the good rewarded in the same bodies in which they performed their good deeds. It was often stated that it would be as unjust to reward or punish a soul for things it had taken no part in as it would to reward or punish a body for deeds it had not performed.
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For various reasons, then, the belief that humans are to be resurrected with the same body has been very common among those of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
Unsurprisingly, the chief question raised by this belief was this: what exactly does it mean to be resurrected with 'the same body'? The prima facie difficulty with providing a satisfactory answer to this question is not hard to fathom, since the diachronic identity of a physical thing has traditionally been thought to be secured by some kind of continuity, whether through space and time or through its constituent parts. But as it is not self-evident that either kind of continuity can be maintained through a body's cycle of life-death-decomposition-resurrection, it is by no means clear how a person's resurrected body can be said to be the same as the one that person had during normal life.
Although the question of what it means to be resurrected with the same body has exercised scholars of various ages, it would be fair to say that concern with it was particularly keen in early modern times, when it was the subject of fierce debates which blotted almost as much paper as those surrounding the cognate concern of personal identity. As Catharine Trotter correctly noted, thinkers of the early modern period interpreted the term 'same body' in very different ways in the context of the resurrection, 13 a fact which has led one modern scholar to remark that 'the very notion of sameness was soaked in ambiguity'. 14 The aim of this paper will be to disambiguate this notion by charting the various ways bodily identity was conceived by early modern thinkers, as well as the key objections their contemporaries developed in response. Documenting this debate will not only contribute much to our understanding of early modern thinking at the interface between metaphysics and eschatology, 15 it will be said, that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the same body is absurd and impossible; because it may happen, that the body of one man, or part of it, may be devoured by another man; and so by eating and digesting it may become the body, or part of the body of another man; so that at the resurrection, the same body can't belong to both, and that the parts that one hath, the other must be defective in. 17 It is worthwhile noting that, in spite of light-hearted treatments of the cannibal problem in contemporary literature, 18 it was taken very seriously by early modern thinkers, not least because the problem is in fact more acute than might first appear.
For as was often pointed out, there is a sense in which all of us are (or at least potentially might be) cannibals, on account of the 'subtle Cookery of Nature', to use Humphrey Hody's felicitous phrase. 19 That is, the matter belonging to the bodies of 6 deceased humans may enter into the bodies of others via a more indirect route than straightforward cannibalism, since the remains of human bodies sometimes nourish plants and animals, which in turn may be eaten by other humans. Considered in this way, the problem of the ownership of bodily matter highlighted by the cannibal problem potentially applies to everyone, not just those who intentionally ingest human flesh. Nevertheless, in what follows I shall continue to refer to the objection as the cannibal problem.
With these considerations in mind, we turn now to the early modern accounts of what it means to be resurrected with the same body, of which I count no fewer than eight.
Raising the body as it was when it died
The first of these accounts is this:
RB1 (= Resurrection Body 1). A person's resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of matter of which that person's body was composed at the point of death.
This account was very popular with the church Fathers, 20 by another, God intervenes to ensure that no part of the former's body ever becomes part of the latter's. 31 Another alternative was put forward by Humphrey Hody, who claimed that while human flesh is assimilable, in the event that parts of one person's body found their way into the body of another, God will intervene to ensure that the latter did not die until the parts of the eaten person had passed out of the system of the cannibal. 32 The adoption of one or other of these theories may have enabled adherents of RB1 to neutralise the cannibal problem, though arguably the extra baggage would not have made RB1 more plausible to most early modern thinkers, especially given the relatively widespread belief that human flesh is assimilable by other humans.
Stillingfleet's 'true and real parts'
It is notable that while belief in 'the resurrection of the same body' was almost unanimous in early modern times, most of those who expressed an opinion on the matter flatly denied RB1, and it is no less notable that those who did deny RB1
generally did so with one eye on the cannibal problem, the force of which seems to have convinced numerous thinkers that humans are not necessarily resurrected with Mankind. 33 The moral Stillingfleet draws from this is that as long as a person's resurrection body is composed of bits of matter that were at one time or another parts of that person's body during normal life (i.e. were 'true and real parts' of that person's body), then that person can be said to be resurrected with the same body. He offers two examples to bolster his case; one involves a victim of cannibalism, the other 'a corpulent Man' who dies anything but corpulent, having fallen victim to consumption. In the case of the cannibal victim, Stillingfleet supposes that the parts eaten by the cannibal will not be returned to the victim, but that this will not result in any deficiency in the victim's resurrection body because the missing parts will be made up with bits of matter which were part of the victim's body before the cannibal struck. In the case of the consumption victim, Stillingfleet suggests that it is not unreasonable to suppose that he will be resurrected with all the parts his body had just before the consumption really took hold. In both cases, Stillingfleet thinks that the resurrection bodies will be considered the same as the ones the two individuals had during normal life.
Stillingfleet's view thus amounts to this: RB2. A person's resurrected body will consist of bits of matter which were parts of that person's body at some point during normal life.
Although it is not explicit, in formulating RB2 Stillingfleet seems to ground the identity of resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies on the fact that there is material continuity between the two, in that the former only consists of bits of matter which were once part of the latter. Yet such a manoeuvre did not convince Samuel Drew, who argued that RB2 contains at least one barely-concealed absurdity, which is that 'there may be as many distinct identities, as there are parts which are capable of constituting them'. Drew's point, which is scarcely clear from this brief summary, draws its force from the fact that, during normal life, a person's body is composed of different bits of matter at different times. This means that there will be a relatively large quantity of matter which, on RB2, will qualify as 'true and real parts' of that person's body. Drew then supposes that God fashions a person's resurrection body by indiscriminately selecting from the bits of matter which once formed part of that person's body; according to RB2, the resultant resurrection body will be the same as the one that person had during normal life. Drew then points out that the bits of matter 'inhering in the body...when it dropped into the grave, will have the same right', i.e.
will also have the right, according to RB2, to be deemed 'the same body' as that person had during normal life. The upshot, writes Drew, is that 'This second number may also constitute another identity of the same body, and we shall then have two identities of the same body, which is an absurdity that surpasses, if possible, a palpable contradiction.' 34 According to Drew, however, the situation is even worse than that; instead of licensing two 'identities of the same body', RB2 licenses a countless number, since there are countless possible arrangements of 'true and real parts' of a person's body, each of which will give rise to 'the same body'. Drew thus offers what he takes to be a reductio of RB2, namely that it allows different bits of matter in different arrangements to be termed the same.
The body raised as it was in any period of life
A variation of RB2 is to be found in other thinkers, such as Samuel Chandler, who writes:
...it is no more necessary to the constituting the same body, that it should be the body we have today...than that it should be the body we had twenty years ago, or the body we may have the same number of years hereafter... The restoration of that body that we had in any period of life, may be sufficient to give it the denomination of the same body. 35 Chandler here supposes that a person's resurrected body will feature the very same bits of matter that together composed her body at some particular point during life.
So on Chandler's view, a person may be resurrected with the very same bits of matter her body had at the age of twenty, or at thirty, or at any other age. We can summarize Chandler's view as follows:
RB3. A person's resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of matter which together composed that person's body at some point during that
person's life.
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In advancing RB3, Chandler presumably intends to secure the identity of a person's resurrection body and pre-resurrection body on the fact that there will be material continuity between them (or rather, continuity between the resurrection body, and the pre-resurrection body as it was at one particular time). Moreover, RB3 is framed in such a way as to defend the possibility of a universal resurrection against the cannibal problem. For RB3 allows victims of cannibalism to be resurrected with the matter their bodies had prior to being eaten, and/or cannibals to be resurrected with the matter their bodies had prior to becoming cannibals. So no one need go short at the resurrection; cannibals and victims alike may be resurrected with the same body (as defined by RB3), together with everyone else. Given its apparent success in resolving the cannibal problem, it is perhaps surprising that RB3 was not advanced more often.
Its apparent lack of popularity cannot be traced to any critical onslaught it received either, as no such onslaught occurred. To a large extent this may have been due to the relative obscurity of the works in which it appeared. For instance, we can only assume that in framing his objection to RB2, Samuel Bold was unaware of RB3, because his objection surely applies to the latter as well as the former. For it seems clear enough that God could, if he so desired, resurrect the body of a person as it was at the age of ten, or at the age of twenty, or at the age of thirty and so on, each of which would have an equal right to be deemed 'the same body', according to RB3, despite each differing in terms of material content and arrangement. And as this is precisely the corollary Bold found so absurd with RB2, it is safe to suppose that he would have had no greater sympathy toward RB3, had he known of it. Both Edwards and Holdsworth appear to hold that God will seek to resurrect each body with the same numerical bits of matter it had when it died, 38 but the fact that this will not be possible in some cases -specifically those in which there is a problem of ownership thanks to the exploits of anthropophagi -seems to have been in no small way responsible for them formulating their conception of 'the same body' which 
The introduction of new matter

Seeds and cores
The inclusion of foreign matter in a resurrection body was also endorsed by, or at least permitted by, our fifth response to the question of how humans retain the same bodies in the resurrection. Very popular in the early modern period, this response borrows heavily, as many of its proponents acknowledged, from 1 Corinthians 15.
There, St Paul notes that, in the case of wheat, what is sown is not wheat itself but rather a seed, with God giving a body to every seed. The vague analogy that many saw here between human bodies and wheat was subsequently enriched by a doctrine drawn from 17 th century alchemy, namely that the seed of a plant lives on even when the rest of the plant dies, and is in fact indestructible (proved, it was often thought, by the fact that a plant burned to ashes later grows again). 41 The combination of St Paul and alchemical thinking gave rise to the view that every human body has an 'essential' seed or core which remains with it throughout the whole of its life and stays intact after death. Moreover, the durable core was thought to be the source of a body's identity, such that irrespective of whichever 'accidental' bits of matter it happened to be joined at any given time, the resulting body was always the same one (as any and all changes that a body underwent were merely to its accidental features, not to the essential core). According to this theory, then, all God needs to do to bring everyone back with the same body is locate the essential core of each body and build it back up with whatever bits of matter he likes. This view can be summed up as 48 and the survival of this guaranteed the identity of the body. Johnson, however, neglected to mention which part of the human body qualified as this vital 'stamen'. And in this he was not alone. Samuel Drew refused to be drawn on 'the dimensions, the texture, the configuration, and the place of residence' of what he termed the body's 'immovable matter'. 49 The naturalist Joseph Priestley spoke of an essential 'stamina' or 'germ', 50 a view he cheerfully admitted he had lifted from the philosopher Isaac Watts, who had in fact been a bit more forthcoming in arguing that the core of the body is its 'essential and constituent Tubes, Fibres or staminal Particles' which were to be found especially in the bowels and bones. 51 Although proponents of RB5 disagreed on which part(s) of the body qualified as its essential core, most were of the view that it was indigestible, i.e. not assimilable into other human bodies (which thus neutralised the threat posed by the cannibal problem) and/or indestructible, 52 though supporting evidence for this claim was typically not provided. Yet the lack of evidence for the oft-claimed indigestibility/indestructibility of the body's essential core was not the biggest concern among critics of RB5, which instead focused on the broad suggestion that the identity of a person's resurrected body is secured by the recovery of its essential core to which other bits of matter can then be added. 'For this is not to assert', wrote happens the flower of substance will persist unharmed, its indestructibility being secured by the fact that it is located in an indivisible point, which makes it impervious to fire ('For who will be able to burn a point?'), 62 the activities of cannibals (it 'cannot be diminished by teeth, or dissolved by the acid of the stomach, nor likewise can it be converted into nourishment') 63 and anything else that can be thrown at it. So every other part of the body may decay, be eaten, or destroyed in some other way, but the flower of substance will persist until the time of the resurrection, when it will suddenly be in a position to diffuse itself through a greater quantity of matter once again.
Key to this theory is Leibniz's belief that the soul contains a kind of blueprint of the body within it: 'the…unity of the body comes from the mind… the idea or essence or the body -namely of this body…survives in the mind'. 64 Consequently, whenever the soul's instrument, the flower of substance, is diffused through a quantity of matter, irrespective of how large or small this quantity may be, it diffuses its identity to it as well. Hence the body a person has at birth is, on this theory, the same as the one that person has at adulthood, old age, death, and at the resurrection, the identity being secured on the continuity of the only essential material part, the flower of substance.
Leibniz's idea can be summarized as follows:
RB6. A person's resurrected body will consist of a 'flower of substance', which is a subtle form of matter into which the person's soul is permanently implanted, and which remains numerically the same 'flower of substance' that person's body had during life, together with a quantity of other matter through which the aforementioned flower of substance is diffused.
Christia Mercer claims that Leibniz's doctrine of a flower of substance is 'enormously clever' for its ability to explain how a human body is able to remain the same while undergoing considerable changes. 65 It is difficult to disagree with this assessment, and its apparent cleverness no doubt explains why different versions of the doctrine were put forward by other thinkers. Samuel Clarke, for instance, independently advanced a remarkably similar theory, albeit much more tentatively and with much less detail. 66 More notably, from a historical standpoint, in the latter half of the 18 th century, Charles Bonnet, inspired by Leibniz, claimed that the germ of the body and seat of the soul is an indestructible 'little ethereal machine' located in the human brain, 67 and that 'the resurrection will be nothing but the prodigiously accelerated development of this germ, presently sealed within the corpus callosum'. 68 And in the Jewish midrashic tradition we find the doctrine of the luz bone, which holds that the resurrection is to be effected from a small almond-shaped bone residing at the base of the spine (or nape of the neck, according to some), which is the seat of the soul. 69 According to the 17 th -century Rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel, 'in the spine there is a particular small bone which is never destroyed; from that small bone alone, after the destruction and annihilation of the other parts of the body, man is restored and brought back'. 70 The parallels between the luz bone and Leibniz's flower of substance are many: both are considered to be the seat of the soul, and both are considered to be indestructible (Menasseh relates the story, found in numerous Jewish commentators, of the failure of Emperor Hadrian's attempts to destroy a luz bone by grinding it, burning it, immersing it in water, and finally striking it with a hammer on an anvil). 71 Common to all such theories, however, is the problem of maintaining the indestructibility of whatever part of the body is identified as being the seat of the soul in the face of Despite the apparent success of the Scholastic account in being able to explain what it means to be resurrected with the same body, it is interesting to note that it has not been historically popular, even among those who devised it! Many Scholastics were instead in favour of view expressed by RB1, 78 despite the problems involved with that. Their reluctance to endorse RB7, which their metaphysics would seem to demand, may in part be due to their adherence to the principle that a privatione ad habitum non dari regressum (there is no return from privation to possession), the upshot of which is that, pace Digby, reintroducing the same substantial form into a quantity of undifferentiated matter does not automatically bring about numerically the same thing; for that to occur, the thing has to go through the same process of generation and corruption it did the first time around. Leibniz notes that their loyalty to the aforementioned principle made it difficult for the Scholastics to grasp how the same flesh can be returned in the resurrection (which is supposed to be an instantaneous rather than lengthy process), 79 while more unsympathetic opponents, like the Cathars, argued that it ruled out the possibility of resurrection altogether. 80 
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Such concerns with the principle that a privatione ad habitum non dari regressum were not, however, responsible for RB7's lack of popularity in the early modern period. For many early modern thinkers the problem lay not with that principle, but with the acceptability of RB7's metaphysical underpinnings. The philosophical credibility of hylomorphism, that is, the doctrine that things are composed of matter and form, was severely eroded with the advent of the mechanistic worldview ushered in by Galileo and Descartes. Crucial to the mechanical philosophy was the rejection of substantial forms, and a reconceptualization of matter as extension (that is, something which occupies space) rather than pure potentiality. Considered to have great explanatory success, the mechanical philosophy became so firmly embedded that, for many, it was difficult to see what grounds there could be for repopulating the world with substantial forms, even if doing so would allow for elegant solutions to otherwise thorny philosophical problems.
Descartes
And it is to a proponent of the mechanical philosophy -Descartes -that we now turn for our final attempt to explain how humans can be said to retain the same body.
Perhaps surprisingly, Descartes's view is in essence very similar to that advanced by Scholastics such as Digby, though arguably it ought not to have been. On the question of the identity of material things, Descartes offers an unambiguous answer:
When we speak in general of a body, we mean a determinate part of matter, a part of the quantity of which the universe is composed. In this sense, if the smallest amount of that quantity were removed we would eo ipso judge that the body was smaller and no longer complete; and if any particle of the matter were changed we would at once think that the body was no longer quite the same, no longer numerically the same. 81 So for a material thing to retain its identity, it must continue to be composed of the very same matter in the very same arrangement. But according to Descartes, such a criterion is not applicable in the case of a human body:
But when we speak of the body of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of matter with a determinate size; we mean simply the whole of the matter joined to the soul of that man. And so, even though that matter changes, and its quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is the same body, numerically the same body, provided that it remains joined in substantial union with the same soul. This is a fair extrapolation from Descartes's view that sameness of soul guarantees sameness of body, for such a principle leaves no scope for Descartes to adopt any position on the identity of the resurrection body bar RB8. Its similarity to the Scholastic view, encapsulated in RB7, is clear enough, though given Descartes's understanding of matter as extension rather than potentiality, and the fact that he has a clear criterion of identity for material things in general, his claim that sameness of a human body hinges on the sameness of its soul has more of an ad hoc feel to it.
Nevertheless, RB8 is obviously immune to the cannibal problem, as for Descartes it will make no difference what (or even how much) matter is united to a soul to form a person's resurrection body; so long as the soul is the same, the body will be so too. As such, there are no grounds for disputes over ownership of bodily matter.
The ability to sidestep the cannibal problem did not, however, immunize RB8 against critical attack. Menasseh Ben Israel, for instance, objected: 'But this opinion is completely absurd, because on this view there would be no resurrection, but only a transmigration of souls into new and different bodies.' 83 Implicit here is the assumption that the identity of human bodies is determined independently of whether they are united to this or that soul or any soul at all. This assumption was shared by many in the early modern period, and ironically it was the undermining of Scholasticism by the mechanical philosophy, of which Descartes was a key figure, that helped to make this so. Nevertheless, by making this assumption, which
Descartes did not share, Menasseh reveals himself to be operating from an entirely different philosophical perspective, and one more in accord with modern intuitions than arguably Descartes's was.
Conclusion
Since the early modern period, the belief that humans will experience a bodily resurrection has steadily declined in favour of the view that the resurrection will be spiritual, 84 and as a result less ink has been spilled in attempts to explain how humans can be resurrected with the same body. Yet many are still committed to the idea of a bodily resurrection, as well as to the position that humans will be resurrected with the same bodies (it being affirmed, for instance, in § §988-1001 of the 1992 Catechism of the Roman Catholic church), and, as noted earlier, efforts are still being made to determine how this should be understood. While some of these efforts have no precursors in early modern thought, others revisit some of the accounts of 'same body' discussed in this paper. 85 Consequently, while the foregoing discussion provides an historical context to the efforts of contemporary scholars seeking to fashion a defensible account of what it means to be resurrected with the same body, I
see no reason why it cannot serve another function, namely as a useful resource of raw materials for present-day thinkers engaged in that endeavour. Indeed, it would be fitting if it was not just problems that one age of philosophy bequeaths to another, but the means to resolve them as well.
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Notes 1 This is true despite the common Christian belief that humans will rise with a spiritual body. Clark, 1870), 215-332.
